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Introduction; Chinese History 
in Economic Perspective
Thomas G. Rawski and Lillian M. Li
Economics and economists tend to bring out strong emotions both in the 
general public and among (noneconomist) scholars. How often does one en­
counter the sentiment, “If economists are so smart, how come they couldn’t 
predict such-and-such [the latest round of inflation, the October ’87 stock 
market crash, etc.]?” Economics has always been a controversial field of 
study, and economists often exhibit a strong professional affinity for conten­
tiousness among themselves. Yet, while society might conceivably get along 
without economists, it would be difficult to imagine a world in which eco­
nomics did not play a role, even the mythical world of Robinson Crusoe. 
Nor can historians avoid the economic aspects of history even when they 
would like to do so. Embedded in all their common notions of how history 
has developed are views, conscious or unconscious, of economic forces; the 
prosperity of the Italian city-states prompted the cultural efflorescence of the 
Renaissance, the Chinese had a rural revolution because the peasants were 
so poor, Europeans conducted oceanic explorations because they needed 
spices, and so forth. But fundamentally, historians need to know about the 
material side of history because they are concerned with human welfare, 
social development, and national histories. The classic definition of eco­
nomics, after all, is that it studies the allocation of scarce resources among 
alternative uses. Therefore, subjects such as agriculture, money, industry, 
and trade compel historians’ interest for a variety of commendable reasons.
It is our contention, however, that the study of such subjects in economic 
history has not always employed a true economic approach or perspective, at 
least among historians of China. This book is dedicated to the idea that the 
history of China’s economy has been written many times in many ways but 
that the economic history of China has not yet been written. This, indeed, is 
not such a history either, but the essays in this volume are intended to illus-
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trate how economic history is not the same as the history of an economy, and 
how an economic perspective involves more than an interest in some eco­
nomic topic. Scholarship on China has excelled in studying the economy of 
China, but has barely begun to do so with a true economic perspective. The 
fundamental objective of this volume is to delineate and illustrate the poten­
tial contribution of systematically applying an economic approach to the 
study of China’s economic history.
STATE OF THE FIELD
Traditional Chinese scholarship did not neglect economic topics. Indeed, in 
the standard dynastic histories, sections on population, land taxes, and 
money, for example, assumed a prominent position. Local histories also 
treated these topics, as well as listing or describing local products, grain 
storage, and the like. A well-functioning economy was the hallmark of a suc­
cessful dynastic regime, a visible sign of the harmony of heaven, earth, and 
man. Economics and morality were linked; a prosperous economy was a sign 
of the essential morality of the ruler. The model of the economy, like that of 
society, was based on the notions of harmony and stability, and not on the 
desirability of growth and change. The golden age of the past was one in 
which men plowed the fields and women wove cloth. Wars and famines sig­
nified the disruption of stability. The goal was to restore the status quo ante, 
the golden age, not to surpass it, because it could not be surpassed.
In recent decades, a difierent paradigm, that of Chinese Marxism, has 
dominated Chinese scholarship. The three broad areas that receive the most 
attention from historians in the People’s Republic of China are land tenure, 
foreign imperialism, and the “sprouts of capitalism.” In the post-Mao era, 
the “Asiatic mode of production” was added to this list. Studies of land 
tenure are closely linked to issues of servitude and subordination among 
China s peasantry in each period of history. Studies of foreign imperialism 
stress the plundering of China’s economic resources by Western powers 
and Japan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the obstacles to 
the development of a modern economy posed by the unequal treaties. 
Studies of the sprouts of capitalism” focus on the signs of development 
in China s late imperial, or early modern, economy (roughly since the mid­
sixteenth century), such as the expansion of handicraft production and the 
freeing of labor in the countryside, but the line of interpretation has shifted 
from time to time—sometimes emphasizing the sprouts themselves and, at 
other times, the smothering of the sprouts. The revival of interest in Marx’s 
idea of the Asiatic mode of production highlighted the dilemma of Chinese 
Marxist historians: how to fit Chinese history into the scheme of world his­
tory. Previously discredited by party historians because it tended to suggest 
that Chinese development did not fit into a unilinear world pattern, the Asi­
atic mode attracted renewed attention in the 1980s in part because it helped
INTRODUCTION 3
legitimize China’s recent economic policies, which may seem to transgress 
the stages of history normally posited in the Marxist scheme of history.
How one evaluates the Marxist scholarship on China is to a certain extent 
a function of one’s ideological persuasion. Certainly the Marxist framework 
provides a compelling agenda for research. Critics think, and sometimes dare 
to say, that the agenda is limited and that the questions posed to some extent 
determine the outcome. But this criticism could be leveled at any paradigm 
or framework. What is striking to us, however, is the extent to which a mate­
rialist or economic interpretation of history has essentially transformed itself 
into social history. It is the struggle between social forces and the conflict o 
social classes that seem to determine the economic stage of history rather 
than the economic forces that determine the social. Marxist historiography
has stood Marxism on its head. ., . .
Substituting modernization theory for Confucian or Marxist theory, the 
postwar generation of Western historians has also sought reasons for China s 
economic backwardness in modern times. American scholarship m the 1950s 
and 1960s tended to focus on treaty-port developments and the introduction 
of Western trade and technology into China, implying that contact with the 
West, even on unfavorable terms, offered an opportunity for positive change 
that was missed.* A second wave of scholarship has focused on the role ot 
entrepreneurship and bureaucratic leadership (or the lack of it) m nine­
teenth and twentieth centuries, finding in them a major reason for China s 
“failure to modernize” along Western lines, even when exposed to Western 
influence.2 a similar vein, scholarship in Taiwan has emphasized the in­
stitutional and bureaucratic aspects of China’s economic development m the
last two centuries. ».r i n • ^In an innovative and influential interpretive history, Mark Elvin tried to
break away from the yoke of Western periodization schemes to show that 
China’s history followed a different “pattern,” in which a medieval economic 
revolution led to a “high-level equilibrium trap” that did not prevent further 
growth, but did impede significant change—“economic development with­
out technological change.’’^ Yet like other Western scholars, and indeed 
like the Chinese scholars, his underlying preoccupation is with explaining 
China’s poor economic performance in modern times. , , , . j
Like Elvin, recent Western scholarship has tended to search back beyon
1. E.g., Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840 1937 (Cam-
E^^^Alben Feuerwerker, China’s Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1862-1874) and 
Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 1958); Yen-p’ing Hao, The Comprador in 
China: Bridge between East and West (Cambridge, Mass., 1970); Wellington K. K Ciinrs, Merchants, 
Mandarins, and Modem Enterprise in Late Ch’ing China (C-n'bridge, Mass W77); and Sherm^ 
Cochran, Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890-1930 (Cambridge,
Mark Lvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford, 1973), Part Three, pp. 203-319.
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the troubled modern period to find strengths and weaknesses in the Chinese 
economy before the nineteenth century that might help to explain its be­
havior after the Opium War. These studies have focused on the role of the 
traditional Chinese state in shaping the economy, particularly in the eigh­
teenth century. Building on Ping-ti Ho’s work on China’s population,'^ these 
studies have, on the one hand, emphasized the positive role of the state in 
encouraging the settlement of undeveloped and frontier areas^ and in main­
taining granary stocks to stabilize prices and prevent famines® while, on the 
other hand, stressing the essential limitations of state power. Yeh-chien 
Wang’s work on Qing land tax, Madeleine Zelin’s work on tax surcharges, 
and Susan Mann’s work on the merchants’ role in collecting commercial 
taxes all tend to show how the Qing and Republican governments were un­
able, and sometimes unwilling, to capture a larger share of the country’s 
wealth for their own purposes.^
Some American scholarship, as well as some Japanese scholarship, has 
shared the Chinese interest in the primacy of social forces in governing eco­
nomic history. For example, standing on different sides of an ideological di­
vide, Ramon H. Myers and Philip C. C. Huang have disagreed sharply on 
the extent to which the land tenure system in North China produced social 
inequalities.® The work of William T. Rowe and others on the growth of 
Chinese cities tends to emphasize the strength of commercial developments 
that took place largely outside the sphere of direct government influence.® 
And G. William Skinner’s influential work on marketing and his macro­
regions paradigm both stress the essential independence of economic activity 
from political trends as embodied in the dynastic cycle.'®
Although there are notable exceptions not captured in this broad sum­
mary, it is striking how American scholarship on Chinese economic history,
4. Ho, Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).
5. E.g., Peter C. Perdue, Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan, 1500-1850 (Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1987).
6. Pierre-Etienne Will, Bureaucratie et famine en Chine au 18e siecle (Paris, 1980), and Pierre- 
Etienne Will and R. Bin Wong, Nourish the People: The State Civilian Granary System in China, 
1650-1850 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1991).
7. Yeh-chien Wang, Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911 (Cambridge, Mass., 1973); 
Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century ChHng 
China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984); and Susan Mann, Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureau­
cracy, 1750-1850 (Stanford, 1987).
8. Ramon H. Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 
1890-1949 (Cambridge, Mass., 1970) and Philip C. C. Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social 
Change in North China (Stanford, 1985).
9. William T. Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889 (Stanford, 
1984).
10. See especially “Introduction: Urban Development in Imperial China” and “Regional 
Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China,” both in G. William Skinner, ed.. The City in Late 
Imperial China (Stanford, 1977).
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somewhat like PRC scholarship, has really revolved around social and insti­
tutional history. In fact, the bulk of the work concerning the Chinese econ­
omy has been done, not by those trained in economics, but rather by social 
historians, anthropologists, and others. Most of these scholars—including 
some of the contributors to this volume—have not in the past made regular 
and systematic use of economic analysis to inform and structure their in­
quiries. In part this may be due to ideological or disciplinary predisposition, 
and in part it may reflect the types of sources available for the study of eco­
nomic history. Traditional official records are strong on bureaucratic institu­
tions and practices but weak in quantitative material. Even so, the tendency 
for researchers to neglect economic approaches in writing the history of 
China’s economy may reflect their limited appreciation of how the eco­
nomic perspective can sharpen an analysis of the historical record.
In the 1960s similar criticisms were raised by a group of “new economic 
historians” against the work of the earlier generation of eeonomic historians 
in the West. Feeling that the traditional economic histories of Europe and the 
United States overemphasized the description of legal and other institutions, 
the new generation advocated the application of economic theory and quan­
titative methods to historical scholarship. With the advent of Robert Fogel 
and Stanley Engerman’s study of slavery in the American South, and the en­
suing controversies, the Cliometric revolution reached its heyday and, some 
have said, began to peak." Nonetheless, a more quantitative and analytic 
approach continues to prevail in the leading journals of economic history.
Our goal is not to champion the introduction of Cliometrics into Chinese 
economic history but rather to advocate adopting a more self-conscious eco­
nomic perspective that may or may not involve quantitative analysis. Our 
belief is that the use of economic theory can illuminate issues that might 
otherwise prove inaccessible. In addition, the contributors to this volume 
have reached the surprising conclusion that applying economic analysis to 
historical topics often enlarges the interpretive significance of phenomena 
that historians, and not economists, are best qualified to comprehend.
ECONOMIC THEORY
What do we mean by an economic perspective? We mean the application of 
economic theory and methods to the study of historical topics.
Classical economic theory, as developed in the West, rests on a number of 
key concepts, whieh some call principles and others may call assumptions. 
The most fundamental of these is the eoncept of choice. Donald N. McCloskey
11. Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro 
Slavery (Boston, 1974). The development of the new economic history is discussed in Alexander 
J. Field, ed., The Future of Economic History (Boston, 1987), in the editor’s introductory essay.
6 THOMAS G. RAWSKI AND LILLIAN M. LI
defines economics as “the study of human choice under constraints.”In­
come and wealth, the conventional measures of economic well-being, define 
the extent of choice available to consumers. In most economies, choice is 
exercised primarily in markets, which offer opportunities to sell commodities 
and human skills in return for income, which can be translated, again 
through the marketplace, into consumption goods. Prices signal the rates at 
which any individual’s resources of money, time, and skill can be converted 
into desired commodities or services. For the economist, prices demand 
attention because they offer precise measures of both choice and constraint 
that (important for the historian) are often recorded in great detail. Markets 
and prices thus emerge from the centrality of choice as natural focal points 
for historical inquiry.
Rationality is a closely related concept. Rationality means that people are 
motivated by self-interest, primarily pecuniary. Economic rationality means 
that individuals, families, and organizations have well-defined ideas about 
how various opportunities affect their well-being and that choice rests upon 
comparison of the cost of available alternatives. Economic rationality sug­
gests that people know how to calculate costs and benefits and that they are 
free to act according to their choices.
The centrality of choice in economics leads to the concept of opportunity 
cost, which defines the cost of a specific action in terms of the value of alterna­
tive options rather than actual monetary outlay. Or, in McCloskey’s words, 
“choosing one thing means giving up another, because things are scarce, 
constrained.”*® In the economists’ view, the cost of education, for example, 
includes the value of income-earning opportunities forsaken by the student as 
well as the actual tuition she or he pays. The opportunity cost of moving to a 
new location must comprehend the value of wages lost while on the road as 
well as transportation costs. Opportunity cost is quite literally the value of 
“the road not taken.”
Much of economic analysis revolves around the concept of equilibrium, 
which portrays economic circumstance as the outcome of a balance of con­
flicting forces. Market price is determined through bidding, a process of 
organized struggle between buyers, who seek to force the price to the lowest 
possible level, and sellers, whose interest is served by attaining the highest 
possible price. Market forces ceaselessly push price and quantity in the direc­
tion of equilibrium. If demand exceeds supply at the current price, anxious 
buyers will bid up the price, simultaneously curbing demand and attracting 
additional supplies. If price is so high that supply exceeds demand, sellers’ 
prices will be bid down, leading toward the balance between desired pur­
chases and sales that characterizes an equilibrium position.
12. McCloskey, “The Economics of Choice” (Unpublished paper prepared for the Workshop 
on Economic Methods for Chinese Historical Research, Honolulu, January 1987), p. 1.
13. Ibid., 1.
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Together with the idea of entry and exit, which simply maintains that pro­
ductive resources, including human labor, will abandon occupations offering 
low rewards and gravitate toward the areas of greatest opportunity, the econ­
omists’ equilibrium notion offers a valuable tool for historical researchers. 
Even though the interaction of supply and demand in particular markets may 
not leave clear tracks in the historical record, the qualitative consequences 
of changes in equilibrium positions often generate shifts in the direction of 
resource flows that will not escape the historian’s notice. As D. K. Lieu has 
observed, businessmen in China (and elsewhere) “are ready to clear out at 
any time” if they see better prospects in another trade. The appearance of 
new businesses and the abandonment of old trades thus become a sensitive 
barometer of relative profitability in different lines of endeavor.*^ Similarly, if 
large numbers of workers migrate from North China to Manchuria, or from 
the rust belt to California, no statistical analysis is required to verify the 
existence of regional differences in economic opportunity.
OBJECTIONS TO ECONOMIC THEORY
When thus presented as a series of abstract concepts, economic theory often 
provokes the deepest skepticism, if not outright hostility, among nonecono­
mists.
Some have charged that these ideas of neoclassical Western economics 
are not universal principles or absolute truths but are, instead, a series of 
assumptions that are largely a matter of perspective or even faith, not sus­
ceptible to proof or argument. Moreover, these ideas are culturally and his­
torically specific, a product of a particular phase of Western history, and are 
not universally applicable. Some, like Karl Polanyi, have argued that these 
ideas themselves have shaped people’s behavior and the development of 
economic institutions, especially markets, that they have been, in short, not 
descriptive but prescriptive.*®
Others object to economic theory because they believe it to rest on a view 
of human nature that is self-fulfilling, possibly erroneous, and certainly 
repugnant. “Rational economic man as a reflection of human nature is a 
fiction. . . . But it is a powerful fiction, and it becomes less and less a fiction 
as more and more of our institutions get pervaded by its assumptions and 
other paths are closed,” writes one recent critic.*® Adam Smith’s notion that 
individuals pursuing their own self-interest are “led by an invisible hand” 
toward improving the society and economy in which they live is difficult to 
reconcile with more flattering views of human nature and human good.
14. Lieu, The Growth and Industrialization of Shanghai (Shanghai, 1936), p. 103.
15. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, 1957).
16. Barry Schwartz, The Battle for Human Nature: Science, Morality and Modem Life (New York, 
1986), p. 325.
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There are those who believe that the classical economists’ view of human 
nature is not only incorrect but that it can be replaced by a superior form of 
morality. Amitai Etzioni, for example, argues for the replacement of utili­
tarianism with ethical principles that stress intention, not result, for the re­
placement of individual calculation with collective rationality, and for the 
replacement of economic rationality with values and emotions.*^
Most others who object to economic theory do so on the grounds that it is 
empirically invalid. They say that simple observation will reveal that not 
everyone is motivated by monetary self-interest above all other considera­
tions and that the notion of economic rationality must therefore be false. The 
economists reply that economic rationality need not imply ceaseless calcula­
tion of cost and benefit by households and businesses, nor must economic 
decisions rest exclusively on financial considerations. Although economists 
often construct theories on the assumption that individuals and business 
firms pursue maximum financial rewards, the notion of rationality encom­
passes the possibility that a desire for prestige or perhaps stability, as well as 
monetary gain, may motivate economic behavior. The recent debate about 
the “moral economy of the peasant” highlights this controversy, with James 
C. Scott arguing that in peasant societies the dominant motive is survival 
and security, so that risk minimization, not profit maximization, is the prin­
cipal goal.*® Economists respond that peasant rationality is essentially no 
difierent from anyone else’s rationality and that avoidance of risk is not in­
consistent with rational calculation.
Critics also protest that rational choice implies perfect information and 
intelligence. But what if someone does not have all the information needed, 
or what if he or she is stupid or, worse still, lazy? I could increase iny finan­
cial resources if I thought about my investments all the time, but I do not 
choose to use my time that way. The opportunity cost, measured in work or 
recreational time lost, is simply too high. But economists reply that decisions 
based on limited information and crude calculations may in fact reflect 
rational behavior. After all, the time and expense required to collect further 
information or to conduct detailed studies of opportunity costs may outweigh 
the anticipated benefits of prolonged search and analysis.
Finally, skeptics reject the idea that people actually have a choice in eco­
nomic matters and are free to enter into or exit from economic activities as 
some kind of economists’ wonderland, full of Mad Hatters. Surely, in real life 
people are not always free to change jobs, change residences, or change in­
vestments according to the dictates of rational calculation.*® Custom, law,
17. Amitai Etzioni, The Moral Dirrunsion: Toward a New Ecorwmics (New York, 1988).
18. James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia 
(New Haven, 1976).
19. The Nobel Prize-winning economist George J. Stigler tells the story of an economist who 
carefully decided how far from the city to locate his country home by efficiently balancing the
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social practice and prejudice, inertia, and any number of restrictions on be­
havior exist today and were even more decisive in premodern times.
Economists, however, recognize that market activity and price formation 
do not occur in a social or cultural vacuum. They see the institutional 
arrangements that circumscribe and encapsulate economic activity—the 
household, legal structures, customary market procedures, forms of contract 
arrangement, business organization, even ideology and morality—as con­
straining economic activity along with limitations on the stock of physical 
and financial resources.But economists regard institutions as flexible 
rather than immutable. If costs exceed benefits, economists anticipate 
change (perhaps gradual) in the relations between individuals and social 
institutions, as well as between buyers and sellers. The post-World War II 
increase in female employment in the United States represents such an event, 
with the unorganized response of millions of women to altered labor market 
conditions leading to changes in marriage practices, family size, child rear­
ing, educational patterns, eating habits, and many other aspects of life long 
regarded as determined by custom and tradition rather than the market­
place.
The clash between economists and noneconomists is perhaps best em­
bodied in the economists’ favorite term, ceteris paribus (literally, all other 
things being equal). While economists will acknowledge the importance of 
noneconomic factors, those bothersome factors are generally left in the back­
ground of their theories and models. Let others study politics, law, social 
class, injustice, and the like. Models can be pure and “elegant,” a favorite 
expression of economists, because all those other factors can be held constant 
or set aside. And since such factors are not easily quantifiable, how much 
more convenient to leave them out. Quantification of the nonquantitative is 
best left to the “soft” social scientists—the sociologists, the political scien­
tists, and the historians.
It is ceteris paribus that allows economists to be optimists. Although eco­
nomics is called the dismal science, in fact economists tend to maintain a rosy 
view of the world controlled by an invisible hand. If only the government and 
others would stay out of it, the rational response to opportunity could pro­
duce growth and a better life for everyone. In the field of Chinese studies, the
number of fresh eggs he could get against the number of friends who would still be willing to visit 
him. In his review of Stigler’s memoirs, Robert Krulwich dryly comments, “Here, I say, is why 
more and more people ignore economists.” New York Times Book Review, Oct. 23, 1988.
20. Jon Cohen, “Institutions and Economic Analysis” (Unpublished paper prepared for the 
Workshop on Economic Methods for Chinese Historical Research, Honolulu, January 1987).
21. In all fairness, it must be said that economists tend to recognize their professional weak­
nesses and know how to laugh at them. Evidence for this can be found in the rich store of 
economist jokes that end with the punch line, “Assume...”
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optimism of the economists stands in marked contrast to the gloomy prog­
nostications of the political scientists. The Chinese economic reforms of the 
1980s inspired great hope among most economists, who tended to see the 
possibility for continued growth and change, while political scientists warned 
of bureaucratic competition, political backlash, social discontent, and other 
dangers, which they said might thwart the reforms.
THEORETICAL REASONING
The tendency of many economists to sweep noneconomic factors into the 
dustbin of ceteris paribus is indeed regrettable. Recently, however, a few 
economic theorists themselves have begun to question the basic assumptions 
of the approaches that have dominated their field. The study of macroeco­
nomics has been described as “a religious battlefield,” where the most 
fundamental beliefs are being challenged.^^ George A. Akerlof, who has con­
tributed to this battle, has said
The unwritten rules that only economic phenomena be considered in economic 
models, with agents as individualistic, selfish maximizers, restrict the range of 
economic theory and in some cases even cause the economics profession to 
appear peculiarly absurd—because, without relaxation of these rules, certain 
almost indisputable economic facts, such as the existence of involuntary unem­
ployment, become inconsistent with economic theory. . . . Individualistic max­
imizing behavior constitutes an assumption that sharply restricts the domain of 
possible economic models. It is an assumption that turns out to be surprisingly 
restrictive.^^
While recognizing the importance of noneconomic factors in governing 
economic behavior, a theorist such as Akerlof is nevertheless concerned pri­
marily with perfecting an economic model, albeit one that he considers 
reasonably consistent with reality. For some economic theorists, it might be 
said, the model is the reality. Many economists tend to value work that con­
tributes to the building of economic theory and to dismiss the study of real 
data as mere “empirical work.” Economic historians, however, have argued 
for the importance of economic history to the development of theory.It is 
our contention that just as economists need to test their theories against his­
torical reality, historians can and should enrich their work through the use of 
economic theory, as well as economic methods.
Economic theory can serve several purposes for historians. At a practical
22. An insight attributed to Mark Kuperberg of the Economics Department, Swarthmore 
College, whom we also thank for the reference to Akerlof’s work (see n. 23).
23. George A. Akerlof, An Economic Theorist’s Book of Tales: Essays That Entertain the Consequences
of New Assumptions in Economic Theoiy {Cambridge, I98i),p. 2.
24. The contributions that historical studies can make to economic theory are outlined in 
essays in William M. Parker, ed.. Economic History and the Modem Economist (Oxford and New 
York, 1986).
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level, some knowledge of economic theory can provide essential context for 
interpreting evidence that would otherwise be misunderstood. Upon learning 
of the small share of imported grain (and more generally, of foreign trade) 
in the economic life of late Qing China, the historian (and even the 
economist) naturally assumes that foreign trade must have played a small 
role in China’s economy, especially in the interior. But this assumption over­
looks the economists’ “marginal principle,” which teaches that market prices 
are determined by the behavior of “marginal” buyers and sellers, who are on 
the brink of indifference between patronizing the local market or doing busi­
ness elsewhere. If the demand for and supply of a particular commodity is 
“inelastic,” meaning the amount people will purchase or sell is relatively 
inflexible in the face of changes in market price (as in the case of heating oil, 
milk, or insulin), then small changes in quantity may lead to relatively large 
changes in the price. Alternatively, if the demand for a commodity is elastic, 
small changes in price may lead to relatively large changes in the quantities 
people desire to buy or sell. Thus shifts in the behavior of marginal buyers or 
sellers can generate large changes in the prices or quantities available to all 
buyers and sellers.
Loren Brandt’s study of Yangzi rice markets nicely illustrates these ideas. 
Despite the small volume of overseas rice trade, Brandt finds that by the end 
of the nineteenth century, rice prices in interior markets, like Chongqing and 
Changsha, were quickly affected by fluctuations in Asian grain markets.2® 
This means that the daily lives of rice farmers, rice consumers, would-be rice 
farmers, grain merchants and shippers, the families and suppliers of these 
agents, their customers and suppliers, and others in interior regions, like 
Sichuan and Hunan, were significantly affected by what seem at first glance 
to be minor economic phenomena. Brandt’s study shows how actions in 
apparently insignificant components of an economy can produce significant 
reactions, even in distant places, through the medium of market forces. 
Many people can verify this “principle” from their personal memories of the 
oil crisis of the early 1970s, when rising energy costs affected travel habits, 
auto designs, building codes, and so forth in the United States, Japan, and 
even oil exporters, like Canada.
The economists’ campaign to win the minds, if not the hearts, of his­
torians can probably not succeed merely by reciting economic principles as 
abstractions or immutable laws. More persuasive, perhaps, is the reasoning 
that is derived from economic theory. Economic theory can serve as a lever 
for increasing the power of a given set of data and a tool for squeezing as 
much meaning and implication from it as possible. For economists, economic
25. Thomas G. Rawski, “China’s Republican Economy: An Introduction” (Toronto, 1978), 
pp. 2-5.
26. Loren Brandt, “Chinese Agriculture and the International Economy, 1870s-1930s: A 
Reassessment,” Explorations in Economic History 22 (1985): 168—93.
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theory will suggest a story, or sequence of implications, about sets of initial 
economic circumstances or facts. The predictions obtained from theoretical 
reasoning can range from simple propositions about the impact on relative 
prices of meat and fish of the Pope’s decision to end the Catholic tradition 
of meatless Fridays to Karl Marx’s grand vision of capitalist decline. The 
stories told by economic historians fall between these two extremes, typi­
cally using short chains of reasoning based on economic concepts to obtain 
predictions that can be tested with historical evidence.2’ Their method 
involves selecting a model, or analytic framework, based on assumptions 
that appear to fit the historical circumstances under investigation, studying 
the logical implications of the model in search of testable conclusions, and 
comparing these predictions, as well as the model’s assumptions, with con­
crete evidence from historical sources.
Several examples can illustrate the value of theory-based analysis as a 
source of hypotheses for the historian to investigate. Consider the case of 
railway development, which, by reducing transport costs and transit time, 
creates new opportunities for trade among cities and between town and 
countryside. Construction of a new railway line should raise the price that 
farmers receive for fruit crops, which now gain unprecedented access to 
urban markets, and lower the cost to farmers of urban factory goods. Terms 
of trade (price of interregional “exports” divided by price of imports) should 
improve for both townspeople and farmers. But China’s new railways be­
came the focus of military strife among competing political groups, bringing 
death and destruction to hapless farmers caught between rival armies.
Lacking detailed information concerning changes in local production or 
the damage inflicted by military operations, how can the historian begin 
to determine the economic consequences of railway construction in rural 
China? Here is where recourse to economic theory, with its capacity to 
reveal causal links that may provide unexpected opportunities to examine 
the consequences of historical events, begins to display its potential. The 
concept of entry and exit immediately directs the researcher’s attention to 
changes in population density and migration patterns as indicators of altered 
patterns of economic opportunity in regions affected by railway develop­
ment. The economic theory of rent implies that trends in land rents and land 
prices can reveal whether, from the viewpoint of local farmers, the opportuni­
ties created by railway development outweighed the damage caused by 
periodic military incursions and, if so, by how much.2® Another perspective
27. Donald N. McCloskey, Econometric History (Houndsmills, Eng., 1987), chap. 2.
28. The idea of using trends in land values to appraise the impact of transport innovation 
comes from Roger Ransom, “Social Returns from Public Transport Investment: A Case Study of 
the Ohio Canal" Journal of Political Economy 78 (1970): 1041-60. For Chinese evidence, see 
Ernest P. Liang, China: Railways and Agricultural Development, 1875-1935 (Chicago, 1982), pp. 
141-44.
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on the consequences of railway expansion comes from Thomas R. Gott- 
schang’s finding that the coming of the railway apparently slowed the pace of 
out-migration from North China, despite reducing the cost of travel to and 
from Manchuria. Apparently the increased opportunity arising from proxim­
ity to rail transport outweighed the reduced cost of migration in the eyes of 
farm families in Hebei and Shandong.^9
Further examples of how historians can benefit from thinking in terms of 
economic theory arise from applying the concept of market integration, also 
known as the law of one price, which postulates that the universal desire to 
buy cheap and sell dear attracts buyers to low-price markets and sellers to 
high-price outlets, thus squeezing interregional price differences toward the 
minimum necessitated by the costs of shipping goods between separate mar­
kets. Market integration is made possible by good and cheap transportation, 
adequate information about costs, and efficient commercial institutions. 
Consumers, as well as economists, like market integration because it gives 
them access to a wide range of products at low prices. Producers value mar­
ket integration because it expands the actual and potential market for their 
goods. Historians should also be keenly interested in market integration not 
simply for what markets show about links among various segments of the 
economy but also because, as the work of Skinner copiously demonstrates, 
analysis of marketing relationships may affect a host of political and social 
factors ranging from taxation to marriage and even language.
Here again, a dose of theory can help the historian to leap over docu­
mentary lacunae, as well as overcome skepticism about the heuristic value 
of economic principles or assumptions. Did agricultural wages, produc­
tivity, and incomes rise in China during the decades prior to World War II? 
To answer this question, one would hope to find reliable information on 
trends in agricultural production and farmers’ incomes. Unfortunately, the 
information available to the researcher is both thin and of questionable valid­
ity. Wage data for nonfarm occupations, however, are relatively abundant. 
Can theory offer a useful link between agricultural circumstances and non­
farm wages?
Unskilled workers in such nonfarm industries as cotton mills and coal 
mines often came directly from rural villages. China’s cotton and coal mag­
nates were profit-seeking entrepreneurs operating in fiercely competitive 
markets that offered little chance to “pass along” rising costs in the form of 
higher prices. They had every incentive to keep wages as low as possible. 
Unless forced to raise wages by government fiat or union pressure, employers 
sought to avoid raising wages except when it was necessary to assure an
29. Thomas R. Gottschang, “Economic Change, Disasters, and Migration; The Historical 
Case of Manchuria,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 3 (1987): 461—90.
30. Skinner, “Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China,” in three parts, Journal of Asian 
Studies 24, no. 1 (1964): 3-43; 24, no. 2 (1965): 195-228; and 24, no. 3 (1965): 363-99.
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adequate work force. As long as rural labor incomes remain stable, mines 
and mills can attract workers without raising wages. If rural incomes begin 
to increase, mines and mills will find their labor supply drying up unless they 
offer higher wages to village recruits. Under these circumstances, a pattern of 
rising real wages for unskilled workers in China’s cotton and coal industries 
can be taken as evidence of rising real incomes in the rural regions that 
supplied miners and mill hands and also in more remote areas linked 
through labor markets to the immediate supplying regions. Because inter­
regional wage differentials induced large numbers of Chinese workers to 
cross provincial and even international boundaries in pursuit of economic 
opportunity, evidence of rising real wages for unskilled workers in the widely 
dispersed cotton and coal industries furnishes strong support for the view 
that the rising trend of labor income was national in scope.^'
Underlying this reasoning is the economists’ conception, or model, of how 
markets, in this case labor markets, function. Textile mills or coal mines 
located in city A customarily obtain unskilled workers (perhaps indirectly 
through the agency of labor recruiters) from rural areas B and C. The mills 
or mines pay wages that are higher than typical farm incomes. This premium 
compensates workers for the cost of journeying to an unfamiliar locale, 
separation from their families, and the risk of industrial accidents. If farm 
incomes in B or C begin to rise, mill or mine wages will look less attractive 
to potential recruits, who will become less willing to leave their villages. 
The mill or mine owners (or labor recruiters) can look elsewhere for job 
candidates or raise wages to encourage more volunteers from the customary 
locations. If young villagers elsewhere are willing to move in response to 
economic opportunity, nonfarm employers may prefer the cheap option 
of seeking recruits from alternate rural locations D and E by offering the 
standard wage. If the rise in farm incomes is a local phenomenon confined 
to B and C, this approach will prove successful in damping upward pressure 
on nonfarm wages for unskilled labor. If, on the other hand, farm incomes 
are increasing across a wide range of localities from which mills and mines 
might seek to recruit new workers, nonfarm employers will find themselves 
unable to maintain an adequate work force without raising the wages offered 
to unskilled recruits. If farm incomes—which provide the financial alterna­
tive against which potential miners and textile workers measure the benefit of 
leaving their home villages—continue to increase, wages paid by mines and 
mills will rise too.
Thus, once it is assumed that labor markets function in the manner spec­
ified, with employers seeking cheap labor supplies and villagers willing to 
migrate in response to premium wages, the theory of market integration, here
31. Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989), 
chap. 6.
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applied to the market for unskilled labor, encourages the historian to per­
ceive the trend of unskilled workers’ earnings in coal mines and cotton mills 
as a barometer of farm incomes, not only in the workers’ home villages but 
also in other villages where mines and mills could easily have sought fresh 
recruits. The link between farm and nonfarm wages is not automatic. Ap­
plication of this reasoning requires the historian to determine that the wage 
data pertain to occupations open to village recruits and to verify the histori­
cal relevance of the behavior patterns postulated in the framework, or model, 
outlined above. If these tasks can be accomplished, economic theory permits 
the historian to construct a powerful and revealing analysis of phenomena 
that are simply not amenable to study through conventional methods.
The theory of market integration can also help to estimate interest rates in 
historical situations. Interest rates are of historical significance because they 
are part of broader economic cycles, because they tell us something about 
trends in the economy, and because they influence individual choices be­
tween current and future consumption. Yet interest rates are difiicult for 
historians to discern. Consequently Donald N. McCloskey and John Nash’s 
suggestion that interest rates are inherent in the seasonal fluctuation of grain 
prices is useful for Chinese historians, since the Chinese historical record 
contains a great deal of detailed information about grain prices. Whoever 
holds grain harvested in autumn for resale or consumption in the spring 
sacrifices the use of the money that could be obtained by immediate sale of 
the autumn harvest. Whoever loans money during the winter months makes 
an identical sacrifice. In other words, the opportunity cost of holding grain is 
the cash that could be obtained from autumn sales, plus whatever interest 
could be earned by that cash over the winter. The law of one price, here 
applied to the market for money, insists that, over a suitably long number of 
years, the earnings from assigning funds to holding grain must match the 
returns from assigning funds to holding debtors’ promissory notes. Thus, 
McCloskey and Nash explain, interest rates, and the variation of interest 
rates across time and space, can be calculated from the seasonal rise in grain 
prices that begins with the annual post-harvest trough and ends at the sea­
sonal preharvest peak.^^
To recognize the importance of market integration is one thing; to define 
and measure it is another. As some of the essays in this volume show, even 
with good price data, it may be difficult to discern whether and when true 
market integration existed in history. Even in today’s world of data collection 
and widespread information networks, economists still have difficulty estab­
lishing what actually constitutes market integration.^3 In antitrust cases, the
32. Donald N. McCloskey and John Nash, “Corn at Interest: The Extent and Cost of Grain 
Storage in Medieval England,” American Economic Review 74, no. 1 (1984): 174-87.
33. For one suggestion, see George J. Stigler and Robert A. Sherwin, “The Extent of the 
Market,” Joama/ of Law and Economics 28 (1985): 555-85.
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appropriate definition of a market includes both the “product market” (i.e., 
whether the product has reasonable substitutes) and the geographic market. 
When Mobil Corporation tried to acquire the Marathon Oil Company in 
1981, Marathon brought an antitrust suit against Mobil. Mobil attempted to 
demonstrate that the relevant market for oil was nationwide and that hence 
the merger would have only a slight impact on prices. For Marathon, on the 
other hand, the task was to demonstrate that the markets for oil were re­
gional and that hence the merger was likely to have a great impact on prices. 
Marathon won the case because, in the words of the court, “the persistence of 
price differentials in various areas of the nation demonstrates that motor 
gasoline does not move from area to area in response to price changes easily 
or as readily as Mobil asserts. Rather, they indicate that the relevant geo­
graphic market for motor gasoline is something less than nationwide. 
Here the debate among lawyers and economists centered, not on the theo­
retical importance of market integration, but on exactly how to define and 
measure it.
ECONOMIC METHODS AND THE DATA PROBLEM
The second aspect of an economic perspective or approach involves method. 
Methodology in economics can mean different things. Broadly defined, it can 
mean a way of thinking or a general approach to hypothesis testing or prob­
lem solving. More narrowly conceived, it can refer to particular statistical 
techniques: the Gini coefficient, the Chow test, and so forth. Although eco­
nomics often involves the use of numbers and quantification of some sort, its 
approach is not absolutely dependent on quantification. At least two of the 
articles in this volume (by Susan Mann and Emily Honig) involve little 
quantitative data, and yet they fully reflect an economist’s way of thinking.
Historians of China may be discouraged from pursuing economic topics 
because of the apparent lack of data. And yet there are, as we shall describe 
later, many more data than meet the eye. Moreover, generations of historians 
have contributed fruitfully to the analysis of economic trends in Europe and 
North America without the benefit of careful compilation or systematic 
analysis of quantitative data. A generation of new economic historians, focus­
ing its attention on the economies of North America and Great Britain, has 
demonstrated that better, fuller results and sounder interpretations are often 
available when research using conventional documentary sources is com­
bined with diligent mining of quantitative materials, which are always de­
ficient in a variety of dimensions. Before succumbing to the defeatist view
34. F. M. Scherer, “Merger in the Petroleum Industry: The Mobil-Marathon Case (1981),” 
in John E. Kwoka, Jr., and Lawrence J. White, eds.. The Antitrust Revolution (Glenview, 111., 
1989), p. 35.
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that certain data are uniquely defective, Chinese historians should consider 
the implication of Nicholas Crafts’s new study claiming that the average 
annual growth of British per capita income between 1801 and 1831 should be 
reduced from the long-accepted Deane-Cole result of 1.6 percent to a much 
lower figure of 0.5 percent, implying that per capita incomes rose by 16 per­
cent rather than 61 percent during 1801—31.^® If British historians cannot yet 
determine whether industry and commerce grew slower (Deane and Cole) 
or faster (Crafts), or whether agriculture grew much faster (Deane and Cole) 
or slower (Crafts) during 1760-80 than during 1700-60, perhaps their 
data, which have supported hundreds of studies in what McCloskey calls 
“econometric history” are no better than the Chinese historians’.
Historians are particularly concerned with detecting trends and cycles. 
Contrary to the political scientists’ old adage “In China if something hap­
pens twice, it’s a trend,” the identification of trends in economic history is 
a bit more complicated. Was the economy growing or stagnating? Were in­
comes rising or falling? Was land distribution becoming more equal or less 
equal? Was the standard of living rising or falling? Not only is this the stuff 
of which the truly important historical debates are made, but it should be 
apparent that this is also the material of present-day debates among politi­
cal candidates. These are questions of measurement that are at the heart 
of economic methodology.
How economists can use incomplete and imperfect data in studying his­
torical problems can perhaps be illustrated with an analysis of the fate of the 
traditional Chinese junk trade in the Republican period. As railways and 
steamships were introduced to the Chinese economy in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, it has often been assumed that they displaced 
the traditional sailing vessels, or junks. But Thomas G. Rawski’s hypothesis 
is that the junk trade not only survived the introduction of modern transport 
but actually increased its volume at the same time that modern transport 
grew.^® If he can prove his case, it would be extremely significant for evaluat­
ing China’s prewar economy because it would show that the rapidly growing 
freight carriage by railways and steamships represented trade creation—an 
important sign of commercialization and economic expansion—and not trade 
diversion—a mere substitution of new technology for old with no change in 
cargo volume.
Economic theory links changes in production (in this case, of transport 
services) to the level of capital formation (construction of new junks). 
Wooden sailing vessels have long service lives. If we assume that participants
35. N. F. R. Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1985), 
as reviewed in the Journal of Economic Literature 24, no. 2 (1986): 683—84; and Phyllis Deane and 
W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth, 1688-1959 (Cambridge, 1967).
36. Based on Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China, chap. 4.
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in the shipping and boat-building trades display the income-seeking be­
havior that economists expect in any market economy (shippers do not aban­
don useful vessels in the absence of significant technological change; ship­
yards do not continue to operate if sales volume and price plummet), then we 
must expect any decline in the volume of junk traffic to quickly erode the 
demand for new ships. This is exactly what occurred on the Liao River in 
Manchuria, where diversion of riverine traflSc to the railways prompted 
observers to note that “there are no new ships built for the river and [the] 
majority of the ships now being used are those constructed more than ten 
years ago.”®^ Information about shipbuilding in the Yangzi Delta (including 
Shanghai), however, shows that the industry continued to thrive despite un­
restricted competition from new carriers. A 1941 survey at Suzhou found that 
14 of 36 ships were less than ten years old.^® Another study lists over 20 
places near Shanghai and along both banks of the Yangzi where shipyards 
continued to operate even after 1940.3^
If evidence from shipbuilding data indicates that junk traffic did not de­
cline prior to 1937, how can we investigate the stronger proposition that junk 
shipping actually increased despite growing competition from steamships, 
motor launches, railways, and trucks? Fortunately, we have some data show­
ing that the junk trade expanded in several important ports and fared well in 
competition with rail, steamship, and cart traffic in delivering cotton to the 
major textile center of Tianjin. This information may be supplemented by a 
series of calculations that estimate the volume of wheat arriving in Shanghai 
by junk. Wheat was one of the most important commodities shipped into 
Shanghai. If junk-borne shipments of wheat increased along with the expan­
sion of railway and steamship carriage, the overall argument about the sur­
vival and growth of the junk trade is greatly strengthened.
Our estimate rests on an equation. The volume of wheat arriving by junk 
was roughly equal to (1) the wheat required by Shanghai flour mills, minus 
(2) the net import of wheat into Shanghai from abroad, minus (3) the net 
inflow of domestic wheat carried by steamship, minus (4) the inflow of 
domestic wheat into Shanghai by rail. Gathering together various pieces of 
admittedly imperfect data, we reach the conclusion that junk-borne ship­
ments of wheat into Shanghai may have risen from 139,000 tons in 1914 to an 
average of 244,000 tons in the 1930s. But how can we defend our estimate in 
the face of the known imperfections in the data we have used? The key is to 
look very carefully at the assumptions employed in constructing the data 
from which these results are derived. For example, there are several different 
figures for overseas wheat imports (2) during 1931—33, the end point of our
37. The Manchuria Year Book 1932-33 (Tokyo, 1932), p. 284.
38. Chushi no minsengyo: Soshu minsen jittai chosa hokoku (Tokyo, 1943), 1:26-27.
39. Shina no koun (Tokyo, 1944), pp. 83-84.
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time series. Our calculations employ the largest of these figures, a tactic that 
lowers the estimated junk inflow for 1931-33 and thus tends to undercut the 
working hypothesis. Second, lacking data on railway shipments (4) in 1914, 
the starting point of our time series, we assume the lowest possible figure— 
none at all. This raises the estimated inflow of junk-borne wheat in 1914, 
again in opposition to the proposed conclusion. Despite these two challenges, 
the calculations are still able to show that junk-borne shipments of wheat 
into Shanghai were substantially larger in 1931-33 than in 1914.
Historians unfamiliar with quantitative research may complain that this 
type of scholarship is no more than a tissue of assumptions, with results 
predetermined before pencil meets paper. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. Assumptions are all laid out for the readers’ scrutiny and critical eval­
uation, and precisely to show that they do not control the conclusions. In a 
world of imperfect sources, the researcher must convince critical readers that 
empirical results are strong enough to overcome possible defects in the 
underlying data. The tactic of demonstrating an assertion to be valid even 
under assumptions that stack the deck against the proposed conclusion is 
commonly used in economics for precisely this purpose. Findings that can 
survive the impact even of contrary assumptions are called robust. Robustness 
is a characteristic eagerly sought by applied economists and carefully 
weighed by readers who find themselves suspicious of published results. If 
evidence favoring the proposed conclusion is so striking that it emerges even 
from data that are skewed in ways that suppress the very trend the researcher 
seeks to establish, even a skeptical audience should acquiesce.
In this way—as illustrated by the examples of using wage data to study 
farm incomes, deriving interest rates from grain prices, and seeking infor­
mation about junk traffic by investigating the fortunes of shipbuilders— 
historians can use economic reasoning to assist them in separating historical 
fact from fiction. Although it was generally said that steam and rail transport 
displaced junk transport, economic theory led to the suspicion that this 
might not actually have been the case, and application of economic methods 
showed that it almost certainly was not the case.
Identifying trends can help economists and historians to distinguish how 
people behave from what people say. If professors complain of low incomes, 
we conclude that they desire higher salaries. It is only when significant 
numbers of teachers leave academe that we can identify professional wages 
as being too low in the equilibrium sense. Unlike intellectual historians, 
who interest themselves in conscious ideas, or cultural or social historians, 
who investigate attitudes and perceptions {mentalites) that are unconscious, 
economists are skeptical about words and self-perception. Because ac­
quiring information is costly in terms of both time and money, economists 
believe that people tend to be well informed only about matters of direct im­
portance to their livelihood and may not see the larger picture. Further-
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more, what people say and write about their economic circumstances is often 
intended to change those circumstances and may not be a reliable guide to 
the circumstances themselves.
But in focusing on broad trends, economists may overlook cyclical events 
or regional variations that greatly affect the lives of those who experience 
them and therefore offer important material for historical studies. Thus the 
conclusion that junk trafiSc increased in China during the decades prior to 
World War II submerges the reality of a regional decline in junk activity 
along the Liao River. In a monumental and influential work on Chinese 
agriculture from 1368 to 1968, the economist Dwight H. Perkins estimates 
the expansion of agricultural output in this period on the basis of population 
size.'*^ The key to his estimate was the assumption that everyone must have 
eaten a minimum diet (or they would not have been alive).
The story of a rapidly expanding population sustained by six centuries of 
increased agricultural productivity certainly paints a rosy picture of the 
Chinese economy and implies that everyone had at least a subsistence diet, 
contrary to a gloomy Malthusian picture that might otherwise be imagined. 
But in fact Perkins’s calculations say only that on the whole people must have 
had enough to eat. His equation does not take into account those who may 
have died from undernutrition, nor does it consider patterns of regional de­
velopment and decline or the possibility of extreme inequality of income and 
welfare. Economists seeking to define long-term trends in average income or 
consumption may not notice that a minority may have eaten, and lived, ex­
ceedingly well, while a larger group may have suffered from inadequate diets 
(since on the whole, or on average, people had enough to eat). As a result, the 
measurement of macroeconomic trends, while offering valuable information 
to historians, leaves much important work to be done in terms of investi­
gating the distribution of gains and losses among regions, groups, and 
individuals.^*
ECONOMISTS AND HISTORIANS NEED EACH OTHER
Our message, then, is not that the economic approach to historical research 
overshadows other types of inquiry or that economics is a panacea for schol­
arly problems. Indeed, the economic approach tends to have its own limita­
tions, such as taking the whole to be the same as the sum of the parts or 
underrating the importance of noneconomic causation in history. Economists 
need to take historical realities into account. But historians need to adopt an
40. Dwight H. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968 (Chicago, 1969).
41. This perception is shared by economists who report that “rapid growth in underde­
veloped countries has been of little or no benefit to perhaps a third of the population.” See Hollis 
Chenery, “Introduction,” in Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth (London, 1974), p. xiii.
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economic perspective, particularly when writing about the economy. We 
contend that history written without the insights that emerge from systemati­
cally applying economic theory and method will be incomplete and impover­
ished. If historians are willing to suspend a certain disbelief about the econ­
omists’ principles and assumptions, systematic application of theory and 
methods may produce insights and results that will weaken the initial dis­
belief The knowledge required for historians to make use of the economic 
approach is neither remote nor inaccessible. The successful completion of 
this volume demonstrates that a brief period of intensive preparation will 
enable historical researchers without extensive economic training to fruitfully 
apply the insights of economic analysis with results that will appeal to 
economists as well as historians. This volume stands as the proof of this 
assertion, and we now turn to a survey of its contents.
CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME
The essays in this volume fall into two groups. The first group relies primar­
ily on grain price data from the Qing dynasty to establish long-term trends in 
the Chinese economy, analyze the nature of market integration, and deline­
ate the role of the Qing state. They could be described as studies of price 
behavior. The second group of papers focuses on the study of land, labor, and 
capital in more localized situations in the twentieth century. Narrower in 
focus and more recent in time, these papers center on the issue of market 
response. In different ways, these papers illustrate some of the general ideas 
about economic perspective and approach discussed above and point to 
further opportunities for work in Chinese economic history.
The essays on Qing price history make use of grain price data from the 
Qing period compiled from the holdings of the First Historical Archives in 
Beijing and the National Palace Museum in Taibei. These data form what is 
perhaps the richest, longest, and most detailed price series for the history of 
any national economy. Starting formally from the beginning of the Qianlong 
period in 1736, each governor was required to submit a monthly report of 
grain prices in his province. This included the high and low price of each 
major grain grown in each prefecture. This monthly provincial report was 
compiled from ten-day reports submitted by each prefecture (/m), which in 
turn had collected ten-day reports from each county [xian). Thus the high 
and low prices noted in the prefectural reports represent the highest and 
lowest prices reported by any county within a given prefecture during that 
month. The number of grains for which prices were collected varied with 
each province. In the South, as many as five or more different grades of rice 
were included. In North China, five to seven grains were reported, including 
wheat, millet, and sorghum.
Although the analysis of these grain price data has just begun, even the
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preliminary results have great importance for Chinese historical studies. The 
records of grain price behavior permit us to establish basic long-term trends 
in China’s historical economy, as well as to identify some shorter-term cycles. 
Grain was the single most important commodity in the agrarian economy of 
imperial China and the best indicator of economic trends. Yeh-chien Wang’s 
article, “Secular Trends of Rice Prices in the Yangzi Delta, 1638-1935,” 
delineates two long-term cycles in that key region of China; a steep down­
trend from the 1640s to the early 1680s followed by over a century of gen­
erally rising prices; and a second cycle of price declines followed by steep 
inflation from the 1880s until the world depression of the 1930s.
Lillian M. Li’s paper, “Grain Prices in Zhili Province, 1736-1911: A Pre­
liminary Study,” shows broadly similar patterns for wheat, millet, and 
sorghum prices in North China, with a peak in the 1820s and another 
steady climb starting in the 1890s. Li’s data suggest the presence of distinct 
short-term cycles of perhaps four- or five-year intervals for coarse grains 
in the eighteenth century, and possibly longer cycles for wheat prices. She 
also finds considerable price fluctuation in the late nineteenth century, before 
the steady upward climb of the early twentieth century.
Much more work remains to be done to determine whether Wang was 
correct in his earlier, pioneering work when he concluded that North and 
South China grain prices in the Qing moved essentially in a synchronic man­
ner, thus contradicting Skinner’s hypothesis of asynchronic regional cycles 
and also implying considerable interregional market integration as early as 
the eighteenth century. Also on the agenda is work that will connect the 
analysis of Qing grain prices with the work of Brandt, who dates China’s 
integration with the international rice market from the late nineteenth
century .^^2
Grain prices can provide insight into the functioning of markets. In par­
ticular, price data can illuminate the extent of market integration within, as 
well as among, regions. Peter C. Perdue’s essay, “The Qing State and the 
Gansu Grain Market, 1739-1864,” reveals that even the remote Northwest 
of China had achieved a considerable degree of market integration, primarily 
through strong state intervention. Because of the strategic importance of the 
Northwest, the Qing court maintained a heavy military presence there and, 
to support it, a granary system that kept relatively high per capita levels of 
grain reserves. Perdue believes that, in conjunction with private storage and 
commerce, public grain storage worked to support the integration of key 
markets of Gansu with each other and with neighboring Ningxia Province.
42. Yeh-chien Wang, “Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Grain Prices in China, 1740-1910” 
(Paper presented at the Conference on Spatial and Temporal Trends and Cycles in Chinese 
Economic History, Bellagio, Italy, 1984); G. William Skinner, “Presidential Address: The 
Structure of Chinese History,”yoama/ of Asian Studies 44, no. 2 (1985): 271—92; Brandt, “Chinese 
Agriculture and the International Economy.”
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Although Perdue’s conclusions must be described as tentative because his 
data series are far from complete, his Gansu data present a strong case for 
market integration even in relatively remote areas of China.
In “Grain Markets and Food Supplies in Eighteenth-Century Hunan,” 
R. Bin Wong and Peter C. Perdue further pursue the issue of market inte­
gration, this time within Hunan Province, a major rice-exporting region in 
central China. Since the general outline and functioning of the Hunan grain 
markets is relatively well documented, Wong and Perdue utilize the grain 
price data to test whether high levels of integration actually existed among 
those prefectures known to be heavily engaged in the rice export trade. They 
find that separate analyses of high prices and low prices each tend to confirm 
integration among the exporting prefectures and lack of integration between 
them and the nonexporting prefectures. They also see in the separate report­
ing of high and low prices an opportunity to test for integration within each 
prefecture, since the high and low prices reported for any month from each 
prefecture presumably represent price quotations from two different counties 
within the prefecture. They find that, with one exception, exporting prefec­
tures had high levels of internal integration. Intraprefectural integration 
was also high in relatively isolated prefectures. In short, Wong and Perdue’s 
findings are reassuring because the “price data generally confirm the outlines 
of the export trade based on qualitative information.”
Because there is a considerable amount of qualitative information about 
Hunan’s rice trade, one may conclude with some degree of confidence that 
high correlations of prices or price differences (the difference between the 
price in the current period and the price in the previous period) do represent 
market integration. Without confirmation of trading patterns, the occurrence 
of high price correlations might arise from common climatic patterns or 
changes in the stock of money rather than from market integration. In the 
case of Gansu, for example, it might be argued that the strong military pres­
ence in the province produced a type of integration of prices based, not on 
true markets, but rather on a large measure of government intervention. 
Perhaps this could be seen as a kind of false or pseudo market integration, 
which is not to deny its historical significance. The same hypothesis could be 
advanced with respect to grain markets in Zhili, where the presence of the 
Imperial court, bannermen, and the military was so pervasive.
We can also use grain prices to examine the short-term fluctuations in 
periods of crises. Li, in her article on Zhili, uses grain prices to test the im­
pact of crises in several difierent ways. Like Perdue, she uses regression 
analysis to try to measure the relative impact on prices of the passage of 
time, seasonality, and natural catastrophes. Overall, she finds that flood or 
drought did afiect prices, as one would expect. But the differences between 
the price levels in normal years and those observed under crisis conditions 
were rather slight in comparison to the differences recorded during crises in
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seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. Most likely, the operation of the 
government granary system helped to stabilize prices and avert catastrophes, 
as well as to provide relief during the crises themselves.
The topic of government grain storage raises a number of theoretical as 
well as historical problems. Recent scholarship on the Qing granary system 
has excited considerable interest. In fact, some of our contributors have com­
pleted a book describing the state granaries and offering important data on 
their management and holdings.^^ For Chinese historians, the state’s major 
role in grain storage comes as no surprise, although the extent and efficiency 
of the Qing granary system is quite remarkable. For non-China economists 
and many historians, however, the notion of public storage requires consid­
erable explanation. Economists, working from the principle of opportunity 
cost, will immediately question whether government effort had any signif­
icant effect on market circumstances. Private citizens store grain because 
they hope to profit from the regular differential between low autumn and high 
springtime grain prices and also from high prices that occur in the wake of 
disasters, such as flood, drought, and war. Government storage efforts in­
tended to limit seasonal price fluctuations and to curtail irregular price peaks 
will reduce the profitability of private grain storage and lower the risk to 
private citizens of not holding grain stocks. Thus, economists will reason, 
public storage encourages a reduction of private storage, creating the possi­
bility that energetic official intervention may have no significant effect on the 
total quantity of grain stored, seasonal price fluctuations, or the price con­
sequences of periodic natural or manmade disasters.
Of course the Chinese historians have a response to the economists’ skep­
ticism. The economists’ assumption that private and public grain storage are 
substitutes for each other is based on the premise that the private sector has 
the capacity to store grain as conveniently as the government. In fact, the 
forthcoming granary volume will show that in per capita terms, the granary 
stocks were highest in China’s most remote and least commercialized prov­
inces. The government, in short, appears to have intervened precisely where 
the private sector was least able to ensure market stability. Put another way, 
the government was subsidizing the storage of grain. In highly commercial­
ized regions, such as the Lower Yangzi area, with its dense network of mar­
kets and transport arteries and extensive private commerce, the government 
could and did leave the job to private efforts and to the market. Larger public 
storage programs might merely have replaced private efforts rather than 
compressing the amplitude of fluctuations. The topic of grain storage thus 
illustrates the economic sophistication of Qing officials. It also provides a
43. Pierre-Etienne Will and R. Bin Wong, Nourish the People: The State Civilian Granary System 
in China, 1650-1850 (Ann Arbor, 1991). James Lee, Jean Oi, and Peter Perdue also contributed to 
this book.
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fruitful example of how the economists’ approach to a problem may help to 
structure historical inquiry and how, conversely, understanding the histori­
cal context helps to modify the predictions of economic theories. Although 
much work has already been done on granaries, the availability of price data 
now creates an opportunity to combine economic analysis and documentary 
research to test and measure the impact of Qing grain storage efforts on the 
economy.
Another theoretical problem raised by the grain price data, also illus­
trated in Li’s article, is that of how to define and identify markets. Do wheat, 
millet, and sorghum in North China belong to the same market, or do they 
constitute separate markets? The principle of substitution teaches that a rise 
in the relative price of wheat or any other commodity will increase the de­
mand for, and hence the price of, items that provide close substitutes for the 
initial product as buyers seek to maintain their living standards or contain 
costs in the face of adverse price change. The question here is to what extent 
people were willing to substitute one grain for another or, elsewhere, one type 
of cloth for another. Such questions bear closely on the question of market 
integration and call for further inquiry.
While the articles of Li, Perdue, and Wong and Perdue deal only with 
grain prices, the articles of Yeh-chien Wang and James Lee, Cameron 
Campbell, and Guofu Tan show how price data can be used in conjunction 
with other long-term data. In his article, Wang arrays his rice price data 
from the Lower Yangzi region together with population data, information 
about silver stocks, and weather trends, to consider what factors may have 
influenced long-term cycles of inflation and deflation in the Yangzi Delta. 
Wang’s preliminary, and pathbreaking, estimates of China’s monetary silver 
stocks indicate a roughly parallel growth of rice prices and the stock of 
monetary silver throughout the Qing period. He finds that in China, as in 
England, long-term trends in food prices display a substantial correlation 
with changes in population and population growth. Wang describes two long 
swings in rice prices during the three centuries prior to World War II. In 
both cases, periods of rising prices coincide with relatively rapid growth of 
both population and monetary silver, while interludes of deflation are asso­
ciated with stagnant or declining population. Wang’s discussion highlights 
opportunities for further study of major factors underlying the long-term 
path of China’s economy. Can we sharpen the causal interrelations among 
population, money stock, commercialization, climatic change, food produc­
tion, and the material well-being of the Chinese peasantry? Do available 
studies understate the long-term significance of international money flows for 
China’s agrarian economy? How closely were the rice markets of the Yangzi 
Delta linked to the farm economies of other regions within China’s vast land 
mass?
In “Infanticide and Family Planning in Late Imperial China: The Price
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and Population History of Rural Liaoning, 1774—1873,” James Lee, Cam­
eron Campbell, and Guofu Tan employ price data to help analyze a unique 
and rich set of Qing dynasty population registers from Daoyi, a rural suburb of 
present-day Shenyang in Liaoning (formerly Fengtian) Province in south­
ern Manchuria. Their major demographic findings are, first, that signifi­
cantly higher levels of infant mortality were found among females than among 
males, although there were greater fluctuations in mortality among males; 
second, that most couples appear to have practiced a considerable degree of 
family planning; and, third, that infanticide, particularly female infanticide, 
was a principal means of family planning. In this article, the authors pose the 
question of how food prices might have influenced birth and death rates. In 
other words, were fertility or mortality affected by times of scarcity, as indi­
cated by high food prices? Their answer is that there seems, on the whole, to 
have been little relationship between food prices and mortality, but there was 
a strong relationship between high food prices and infanticides, particularly, 
but not exclusively, female infanticides. While these conclusions are likely to 
be hotly debated, in part because it is unclear whether Liaoning or Manchu­
rian family patterns are generalizable to the rest of China, Lee, Campbell, 
and Tan have pointed toward a direction in research that has not previously 
been pursued in Chinese history.
The second group of essays in this volume focuses on issues more familiar 
to modern Chinese history—urban and rural poverty, the economic con­
sequences of political unrest, and economic growth or the lack of it. In deal­
ing with the factors of land, labor, and capital in local or regional settings, 
these essays pursue large issues in a more focused, and perhaps more man­
ageable, way than the first set of articles. In each case, we see the interplay 
between economic analysis and historical inquiry. Economic models open 
new avenues of inquiry for historians, while the historical context illuminates 
the social and institutional conditions that shape the impact of economic 
forces in particular times and places.
In the first of these essays, “Land Concentration and Income Distribution 
in Republican China,” Loren Brandt and Barbara Sands—the only econo­
mists among our contributors—address the issue of land concentration and 
income distribution in twentieth-century China. They challenge the com­
monly held view that there was increasing concentration of land ownership 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that concentration of 
landed wealth necessarily produced wide inequalities in the distribution of 
income. Although the data from the 1920s and 1930s show a highly unequal 
distribution of land, Brandt and Sands show that shifting the statistical base 
from landholding per household into per capita terms narrows the gap be­
tween poor and wealthy households. They argue that without comparable 
data for earlier periods, there is no basis for claiming that the degree of con­
centration of land ownership was rising over time.
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Their key point, however, is that in the complex economy of North China, 
the distribution of per capita income depended on earnings from the dis­
position of labor and goods as well as land, so that the concentration of land- 
holdings need not have coincided with the concentration of incomes. If, 
as hypothesized by Peter H. Lindert, “the common folk,” who specialized in 
producing and selling goods that embodied large components of unskilled 
labor, “were among the greatest gainers” from the expansion of China’s 
domestic and international trade, the spread of commercial agriculture fol­
lowing the growth of trade and transport may emerge as a significant source 
of reduced income inequality in the North China countryside.'*^'*
Although Brandt and Sands analyze three villages selected for their 
distinct economic characteristics, skeptics will note the small size of their 
sample and the possible biases inherent in their principal source, the South 
Manchurian Railway Company village surveys, which form the basis for a 
number of controversial studies of peasant welfare in North China.^^ For our 
purposes, however, of greater interest than the ultimate correctness of their 
interpretation is the economic approach or perspective that they have em­
ployed. By posing a theoretical issue, then isolating a number of key vari­
ables and finding an appropriate set of data, the authors create a framework 
for systematic analysis of the issue at hand. Finally, by placing the Chinese 
issue in comparative, international terms, the authors provide a baseline or 
context within which to judge the issue of large or small. At what point 
should income inequality be considered large? Too large? Such judgments 
require not only quantification but also appropriate context.
Lynda S. Bell approaches the issue of rural income from another perspec­
tive: she looks at the silk industry in Wuxi, an area in the Lower Yangzi 
region that developed into a major sericultural and silk-reeling center in the 
nineteenth century after the Taiping Rebellion. In “Farming, Sericulture, 
and Peasant Rationality in Wuxi County in the Early Twentieth Century,” 
Bell explores an apparent paradox: why, in one of the more prosperous re­
gions of China, did peasants in the 1920s and 1930s experience low incomes 
from sericultural activity? And why should peasants continue to pursue seri­
culture even though, as she effectively demonstrates, the returns per unit of 
labor were lower for mulberry cultivation and silkworm raising than for rice 
or wheat farming? Does this mean that farm households were not acting 
rationally or that they were engaged in a kind of “self-exploitation” in the 
manner described by A. V. Chayanov for the Russian peasantry? The key to 
this paradox. Bell finds, is that women supplied most of the labor in seri-
44. Peter H. Lindert, “International Economics and the Historian” (Revision of a paper 
prepared for the Workshop on Economic Methods for Chinese Historical Research, Honolulu, 
September 1987), p. 30.
45. Myers, Chinese Peasant Economy, and Philip C. C. Huang, Peasant Economy, also rely on 
these surveys.
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culture. Compared to other domestic industries they could engage in, such 
as cotton weaving, sericulture brought superior returns. Only factory work 
could have brought higher wages to women, but the opportunity cost—in 
terms of domestic labor lost to the family if the woman left for a factory— 
outweighed the extra income that might have been earned. Moreover, Bell’s 
calculations reveal that even at the depressed silk prices of the 1930s, income 
from sericulture allowed Wuxi farm households to buy more rice than they 
could have grown on the land occupied by mulberry plants. So Bell finds 
peasant choices ultimately to be rational, but cautions that rationality need 
not imply that they were earning large profits; rather, rationality was what 
kept them going in an economy in which subsistence, rather than profit, was 
still the major preoccupation. Participation in an international market pre­
sented new opportunities, but Wuxi peasants found that it also presented 
new risks.
While the economic value of female labor implicitly figures in Bell’s 
article, it is the main topic of Susan Mann’s essay, “Women’s Work in the 
Ningbo Area, 1900—1936.” Using rich qualitative materials from a relatively 
commercialized region of China, Mann delineates the factors that afiected 
both the demand for, and the supply of, female labor. On the demand side, 
she shows that there were many opportunities for female workers both within 
and outside the household in the Ningbo area and that the hierarchy of jobs, 
from the women’s perspective, was less related to wage levels than to the 
perceptions of social respectability and the degree of personal convenience 
associated with each type of work. On the supply side, the availability of 
female labor from each household was dependent on three major factors: its 
size, its other resource endowments (these two were, of course, closely re­
lated), and its stage in the family cycle. Families with adult women who had 
no child-care responsibilities (young women before marriage or “able-bodied 
widows”) were most likely to have labor to spare and therefore to benefit 
from new opportunities for female employment within the household. Fac­
tory employment, which violated social conventions that restricted respect­
able women to working within the household, was acceptable only to women 
from “poor households strategizing to keep their menfolk afloat.”
In “Native-Place Hierarchy and Labor Market Segmentation: The Case 
of Subei People in Shanghai,” Emily Honig addresses an apparent puzzle: 
why were people from Subei, the area of Jiangsu Province north of the 
Yangzi River and south of the Huai River, routinely barred from certain types 
of employment in Shanghai, even when they would have worked for lower 
wages than employers paid to natives of south Jiangsu? Regarded as inferior 
human beings, the Subei people in Shanghai were condemned to the least 
attractive and least remunerative forms of employment—rickshaw pulling, 
night soil and garbage collecting (literally, as she says, “shit work”), bar- 
bering, and so forth—within a clear hierarchy of jobs. Honig employs the
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economists’ concept of segmented labor markets to show that in Shanghai, 
it was not race, religion, or ethnicity that formed a barrier to free entry and 
exit, but native-place hierarchy.
Both Mann’s and Honig’s articles show that the economists’ notion of 
choice has to be tempered by the social historians’ understanding of gender, 
class, and native-place ties. Despite the heuristic value of the economists’ 
notion of ceteris paribus, historians find that all other things are rarely equal 
and in fact it is the “other things” that may hold the key to understanding the 
flow of events. Still, the approach of these two papers is entirely consistent 
with an economic perspective. To start with the assumption that there 
should be a unified labor market with no barriers to exit or entry and with 
essentially one wage scale is not wrong; what would be wrong is to stop there. 
Looked at from the employers’ perspective, labor market segmentation rests 
on their need to assess the qualifications and character of would-be em­
ployees or associates. With no access to data banks or credit histories, they 
must seek a quick and inexpensive screening device. Discrimination on the 
basis of ethnicity, place of origin, linguistic background, or education, can be 
partly understood simply as a cost- and risk-reducing business decision.
Susan Mann’s Ningbo women benefited from their reputation for dili­
gence, skill, and gentility. Employers preferred workers from Ningbo and 
other south Jiangsu communities over migrants from the north not only be­
cause of their superior technical and social skills but also because kinship ties 
and networks of regional association were available for disciplining and con­
trolling south Jiangsu workers, making it more profitable to hire them, even 
when they might require higher pay than northerners. By the same token, 
Subei natives were discriminated against. Businessmen preferred to deal 
with those whose background seemed to increase the likelihood of the suc­
cessful fulfillment of agreements. When disputes arise, the existence of volun­
tary organizations, such as native-place associations (huiguan), increases the 
probability of speedy resolution of conflict by informal procedures acceptable 
to all parties. Drawing on the economic theory of clubs, Janet T. Landa has 
proposed just such an explanation for the tendency of Chinese businessmen 
in Southeast Asia to deal preferentially with Chinese whose ancestors mi­
grated from the same district or province, secondarily with other Chinese, 
and only if other contacts are not available, with local non-Chinese or with 
foreign business partners.^®
Finally, Kenneth Pomeranz’s article, “Local Interest Story: Political 
Power and Regional Differences in the Shandong Capital Market, 1900—
46. Janet T. Landa, “The Political Economy of the Ethnically Homogeneous Chinese Mid­
dleman Group in Southeast Asia: Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship in a Plural Society,” in The 
Chinese in Southeast Asia, vol. 1, ed. Linda Y. C. Lim and Peter L. A. Gosling (Singapore, 1983),
pp. 86—116.
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1937,” illustrates how political structures can decisively influence the out­
come of economic change. During the early twentieth century, Shandong 
Province experienced an expansion of markets and commerce similar to that 
in the Wuxi region of Jiangsu Province in an earlier period. As in Jiangsu, 
Shandong villagers were quick to avail themselves of new economic opportu­
nities, specializing in peanuts and other cash crops in some regions and, as 
Pomeranz documents, exporting large quantities of underpriced copper coins 
whenever it became possible to do so.
Shandong’s political elite found themselves torn between the gains avail­
able from encouraging economic integration and the benefits for themselves 
and their mercantile allies of using military force to obstruct integration and 
then exploit the resulting regional price gaps for pecuniary gain. With lead­
ers in different regions responding differently to market circumstances, Shan­
dong’s economy displayed lines of demarcation that reflected the impact of 
political decisions more than economic, social, or geographic forces. Despite 
a national trend toward economic integration, the needs of state making dur­
ing this turbulent period of Shandong’s history prompted local authorities to 
restrict the movement of specie across administrative boundaries, leading to 
marked regional variations in both the silver-copper ratio and local interest 
rates that illustrate a real political constraint on the spread of purely market 
forces.
CONCLUSION
The essays in this volume do not fall into any single neat line of interpreta­
tion about the economic history of China over the last two or three centuries. 
Pomeranz’s detailed work on Shandong cautions us against any broad gener­
alizations about the extent to which the treaty ports in nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century China affected the hinterland economy. Pomeranz shows 
us that the more advanced, coastal area did interact with the hinterland but 
that political intervention prevented a higher degree of market integration.
The works of Bell, Mann, and Honig also contain a cautionary message. 
Even in the Lower Yangzi macroregion, the most agriculturally prosperous 
and commercially advanced area of China, the opportunities for economic 
gain for individual peasants or workers, although often greater than ever 
before, could be undercut by international economic instability, gender dif­
ferences in the returns to labor, and unequal access to the urban labor mar­
ket. The story that Brandt and Sands tell, however, contains the reverse 
message. In the much more adverse conditions of North China, all may not 
have been so bad as it appeared. New employment opportunities provided 
more channels for a family’s economic gain than just landholding. Entry to 
and exit from these lines of work appear unimpeded in the North China 
world they describe.
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The lessons of the articles in Part 1 are somewhat different. In some cases, 
the findings of these grain price studies confirm previously known trends or 
previously advanced hypotheses. For example, Wong and Perdue’s study of 
Hunan’s grain price series confirms commercial patterns already discerned 
through qualitative sources. Li’s case studies of crises parallel the results of 
Pierre-Etienne Will’s documentary study. Perdue’s delineation of marketing 
patterns in Gansu coincides with G. William Skinner’s predictions about the 
spatial patterns of Gansu’s commodity trade. In other cases, such as Wang’s 
study of money supply or Lee, Campbell, and Tan’s study of Liaoning, new 
materials have generated new hypotheses about long-term trends.
These essays also contain the potential for even bolder messages, perhaps 
revisions of current received wisdom, about China’s economic history over 
the last two or three centuries. Some readers may derive from the essays in 
Part 1 a picture of the eighteenth-century economy as more advanced in 
commercial development and market integration than previously thought. 
Certainly, the quality of the Qing bureaucracy’s price data seems higher 
than that of its population records, the systematic fabrication of which 
Skinner has recently exposed.Wang’s compilation of information on stocks 
of monetary silver creates an opportunity for using the equation of exchange 
to investigate the implications of Dwight Perkins’s long-standing assertion 
that, on the average, Chinese living standards, as measured by the availabil­
ity of grain, experienced no long-term upward or downward trend during the 
Ming and Qing dynasties.The essays in Part 2 all illustrate, in varying 
ways, the extent to which commercialization, including the development of 
foreign as well as domestic trade, penetrated the local economies of many 
areas. The story of expanding commercial networks finds a basis in these 
papers, but there are other stories that have been, and will be, told about the 
modern economy.
Despite the many insights and contributions contained in the essays that 
follow, we believe, however, that the real lessons of this volume are not the 
substantive ones. In each case, economic theories and methods have been 
employed to clarify the facts of history and to advance its understanding.
47. G. William Skinner, “Sichuan’s Population in the Nineteenth Century: Lessons from 
Disaggregated Data,” Late Imperial China 8, no. 1 (1987): 69.
48. If we assume parallel growth between silver stocks and money supply, between grain 
prices and the general price level, and between foodgrain production and total output, the 
equation of exchange can be used to derive the time path for income velocity of monetary 
circulation implied by Wang’s data on silver, grain prices, and population together with Per­
kins’s hypothesis of stable per capita output. The plausibility of the resulting velocity estimates 
and of changes that might arise from adjustments reflecting known biases in the underlying data 
(we know, for example, that money supply grew faster than silver stocks in the late nineteenth 
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Without a fundamental understanding of the laws of supply and demand and 
the significance of market integration, none of the essays in Part 1 could have 
been written. Without an appreciation of how factor markets operate, the 
essays in Part 2 would have been greatly weakened. Wang’s article provides 
an excellent example of how economic theory, in this case the quantity theory 
of money, can inform both the construction and interpretation of economic 
data to help formulate new questions and hypotheses.
In many of the essays, however, a simple economic approach in itself 
would lead to an impasse or a seeming contradiction. These apparent puz­
zles, such as Shandong’s lack of monetary integration or Wuxi’s apparent 
poverty in one of China’s most prosperous regions, can only be explained 
with reference to the institutional and social context that historians are 
uniquely qualified to understand and explain. Without knowledge of the 
social prejudices attached to Subei people, their lowly position in Shang­
hai’s labor force would defy understanding. Without knowing the history of 
the Chinese bureaucracy and the fundamentals of Confucian political theory. 
Western-trained economists find it difficult to comprehend why the Chinese 
state should have maintained a vast civilian granary system in the Qing 
period. Often the results of economic analysis raise questions that compel us 
to further noneconomic inquiry. The surprising demographic behavior of the 
Han Banner population of Liaoning causes us to want to know more about 
their ethnic background, their family structure, and their food allocation 
habits and in particular to understand whether they were very different from 
Han Chinese who lived within the Great Wall. In short, economic analysis 
cannot stand alone and, in almost every case, offers rich opportunities for 
work with other disciplines—sociology, anthropology, politics, and history.
Chinese economic history is barely coming into its own as a field of study. 
What this volume is intended to show, to its authors as well as to our col­
leagues and students, is that further study of China s economic history that 
systematically utilizes the theories and methods of economics can generate 
new hypotheses and fresh perspectives that will enrich the study of all aspects 
of China’s history as well as deepen our understanding of the structure and 
evolution of the Chinese economy itself.
